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Arguments for public involvement in science and technology are often 
based on ideas of developing a more capable public and the assumed 
effects this may have for science.  However, such a relationship is yet to be 
sufficiently explored and recent work indicates that a more involved public 
may have counterintuitive effects.  Using nationally representative survey 
data for the UK and Northern Ireland, the effects of the publics own beliefs 
about involvement are explored.  Developing the concept of  „belief in 
public efficacy‟, findings suggest those who believe that the public might 
be able to affect the course of decision making have less approving 
attitudes towards future applications of genetic science, however, an 
individual‟s political efficacy does not significantly influence these 
attitudes.  Furthermore, political efficacy and belief in public efficacy have 
some distinct and opposing relationships with the principles of governance 
people prefer.  Overall, findings provide support for suggestions that it is 
simplistic to consider increasing public involvement as a way of increasing 
the approval of risky new technologies.  
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 1. Introduction 
Science and a more involved public 
Interest in science is increasing in the UK, with approximately eight out of ten 
people „moderately‟ or „very interested‟ in new inventions, technologies, and 
scientific discoveries; and, as many as nine out of ten similarly interested in new 
medical discoveries (People Science & Policy Ltd/TNS, 2008b).  Survey data 
suggest that the UK public are mostly supportive of science, with nearly half 
believing the benefits of science outweigh any negative consequences (European 
Commission, 2005).  However, the UK public also have reservations about the 
role and remit of science and technology; with 61% agreeing that “science and 
technology are responsible for most of the environmental problems we have 
today;” and, only 14% agreeing that science and technology can “sort out any 
problem” (European Commission, 2005: 62, 60). 
The UK public are uneasy about the spontaneity and speed of scientific 
developments that appear to outpace consultation processes (House of Lords, 
2000) and in response the UK Government has called “on all public bodies to be 
more open and responsive to the needs of the citizens they serve” (HM 
Government, 2005: 2).  The answer to this call has principally been viewed as 
increased public participation in science and technology (Leshner, 2005; Willsden 
& Willis, 2004; DEFRA, 2001).   
Genetic science provides a particularly pertinent opportunity to investigate 
the role of public involvement.  Reported interest in genetic science is very high 
(People Science & Policy Ltd/TNS, 2008a) and it is an area where attempts to 
involve the public have already been made (DTI, 2003).  Yet, the public are 
mostly unimpressed with the role of government and industry in this area (Gaskell 
 et al., 2003) and attitudes mostly take a sceptical although not overly hostile 
quality (MORI, 2005).   
National surveys indicate that the public are generally dissatisfied with the 
level of seriousness with which the Government considers their views.  Almost 
half of the UK public feel that public involvement in science and technology is not 
adequate, and confidence in consultation processes is low (MORI, 2005; People 
Science & Policy Ltd/TNS, 2008a).  Demand for timely information and greater 
acknowledgement of the interest of the public in science and technology is high, 
with as many as 78% of the public agreeing they “ought to hear about potential 
new areas of science and technology before they happen, not afterwards” (People 
Science & Policy Ltd/TNS, 2008a: 20).  Despite the Government‟s awareness of 
its need to “demonstrate that it has listened to the public‟s views and taken them 
seriously” (HM Government, 2005: 4), the public engagement activities organised 
by or on behalf of Government continue to include desires to increase the public‟s 
trust (People Science & Policy Ltd/TNS, 2008b; Petts, 2008).  For example, the 
Science and Trust Expert Group proposed action plan will in part aim to “develop 
new mechanisms to increase public trust in science and engineering” (Department 
for Business Innovation and Skills, n.d.).  Even where governments do appear to 
be trying to take the lead by increasing public participation in scientific debate 
through enforcing their own definitions of participation and involvement any 
alternative action by the public (such as protests or boycotts) is likely to be 
undervalued.  The significance of this is supported by empirical research showing 
that political participation in the UK is moving beyond traditional party affiliation 
and vertical dialogues (Li & Marsh, 2007; Bang, 2005).  In fact, such participation 
is increasingly taking on new forms which have been found to relate to levels of 
 efficacy (Li & Marsh, 2007).  Thus, it becomes ever more likely that people‟s 
beliefs in their own and their collective‟s efficacy will make significant 
contributions to their preferred approaches to science governance and regulation. 
 
A more efficacious public? 
The origins of the field of study known as „public understanding of science‟, to 
some degree at least, has its roots in the democratisation of the public.  Much of 
its early impetus was based on raising the „scientific literacy‟ of publics to levels 
which meant they could represent their interests as the role of scientific and 
technological innovations were becoming more increasingly important (Sturgis & 
Allum, 2004; Bodmer, 1985).  However, the primary motives for increasing 
scientific literacy, as well as more recent attempts to increase public 
understanding and involvement in science, have even stronger roots in the 
government and business agendas of „selling science‟ (Sturgis & Allum, 2004; 
OST & Wellcome Trust, 2001; Nelkin & Lindee, 1995).  The success of both 
agendas is arguably poor: scientific knowledge is often found to be low (Jowell et 
al., 1997; Durrant, Evans & Thomas, 1989) and there has been both rising 
scepticism and diminishing conviction in the benefits of science (Gaskell et al., 
2001; Hargreaves, 2000; House of Lords, 2000; Miller, Pardo & Niwa, 1997; 
Touraine, 1985).  Despite the Government rhetoric that supposes greater public 
involvement may smooth the introduction of new or „risky‟ technologies, 
suggestions thus far are that a more efficacious public may actually lead to a more 
critical approach to potentially risky technologies rather than overly legitimising 
attitudes (Barnett, Cooper & Senior, 2007) and that this more critical stance may 
actually be more desirable (Pidgeon, Poortinga & Walls, 2007). 
 In reality, little is known about the effect of formal public participation 
initiatives insofar as there are rarely evaluations of processes or, more particularly, 
of outcomes (see Petts (2008) for a recent discussion of this area).  More 
generally, empirical research into the relationship between efficacy and public 
participation in politics has found that people who have both a strong belief in the 
power of their collective voice and are trusting of their systems of governance are 
more likely to take an active role in political activities (Bandura, 2000).  Also, 
when trust in governing systems is low but belief in a collective voice remains 
high, political action outside conventional channels is preferred (ibid.).  While 
there appears to be increasing public interest and desire for more public 
involvement in science, there only appears to be  a low proportion of the public 
displaying a „belief in public efficacy‟; less than one in three in the case of genetic 
science (Barnett, Cooper & Senior, 2007).  This has parallels with other areas of 
public participation where those with little confidence in the ability to affect 
governing systems, whether in themselves or a collective, may turn to silence 
through disaffection rather than lack of concern (Marris et al., 2001; Bandura, 
2000).  
A large body of research has identified a wide range of factors, values, 
views etc, which influence the public‟s attitudes towards science, these include: 
political and scientific knowledge, “culture, economic factors, social and political 
values, trust, risk perception, and worldviews” (Sturgis & Allum, 2004: 58).  
Along with knowledge, the role and influence of institutional trust on attitudes to 
science and technology has received extensive attention, largely because of the 
widespread findings that publics have low trust and confidence in many of the 
institutions and actors involved in science practice, policy and governance 
 (MORI, 2005; Poortinga & Pigeon, 2004; House of Lords, 2000).  Plus, higher 
trust has been seen to reduce the differences between expert and lay opinion, 
while its absence may intensify concern or threaten future developments (House 
of Lords, 2000; Earle & Cvetkovich, 1995).  Recent research has suggested that 
trust and belief in public efficacy appear to work in opposite directions in relation 
to people‟s permissiveness and favourability towards modern genetic science 
(Barnett, Cooper & Senior, 2007).  However, the relationship between political 
efficacy and attitudes towards science is yet to receive attention.  Investigation 
into the influence of political efficacy on attitudes towards science is felt to be 
particularly relevant because “the ways in which science is practiced, regulated, 
and deployed in society is still essentially a “political” matter” (Sturgis & Allum, 
2004: 60). 
Political efficacy is quite distinct from belief in public efficacy as discussed 
above.  Political efficacy provides a measure of people‟s confidence in making 
demands of governing systems and getting adequate responses from that system.  
Within the political system, political efficacy has a positive association with trust 
in the government to look after the needs of the country (Bromley et al., 2001).  
So, a positive association between political efficacy, trust and satisfaction with 
science governance may be expected.  Though science governance is not 
measured in terms of satisfaction in this study, empirical research is suggesting 
that higher political efficacy will be related to attitudes which allow experts to 
make decisions. 
Some sections of the public have been found to desire a greater say in the 
principles on which science is governed.  More than half of the European public 
are happy to go along with the “status quo” of decisions being made by experts on 
 the basis of scientific evidence (Gaskell et al., 2005).  Overall, nearly two-thirds 
opt for a scientific basis to decision making and three-quarters opt for experts to 
do the decision making.  However, there remains a sizeable minority opting for 
alternative governance principles.  More than a third would like moral and ethical 
issues to be considered over scientific evidence, and a quarter would prefer the 
public to make such decisions (ibid.).  This study will explore the relationship 
between the public‟s views of their own agency and their preferred principles of 
science and technology governance. 
 
Researching efficacy and its relation to attitudes towards genetic science and 
science governance  
In summary, a situation where public agency is seemingly being fostered has been 
described.  However, it has also been shown that little is known about what effect 
a more agentic public could have; and indications so far, are that a more confident  
and engaged public does not necessarily equate to a „science-loving‟ public 
(Barnett, Cooper & Senior, 2007).  Utilising social-cognitive theory, in which 
people‟s perceptions of their own efficacy is taken to be the foundation of human 
agency (Bandura, 1997), this study investigates how individuals‟ perceptions of 
agency, vis-à-vis political efficacy, influence their approval of genetic science and 
the principles of science governance they opt for.  Furthermore, we argue that 
there is good reason to believe that both personal and collectivist concerns should 
be considered when addressing people‟s motivations for civic participation 
(Barnett, Cooper & Senior, 2007; Simmons & Burchell, 2005; Bandura, 2000).  
Therefore, this study extends the metrics of efficacy, and builds on previous 
research (Barnett, Timotijevic, Vassallo & Shepherd , 2008; Barnett, Cooper & 
 Senior, 2007) by incorporating a measure of people‟s belief in public efficacy into 
the investigation. 
Political efficacy is defined as people‟s belief that they can make demands 
of governing systems and get adequate responses from these systems.  Belief in 
public efficacy is defined as people‟s belief that the public can play a role in the 
governance of science and technology and affect the course of decision making.  
Barnett, Cooper and Senior (2007) have suggested that a belief in public efficacy 
may have similar attributes to Bandura‟s (1997, 2000) concept of perceived 
collective efficacy.  In social-cognitive theory, perceived efficacy is taken as a key 
influence on an individual‟s or collective‟s actions, including: their choices; the 
amount of effort they exert; their resilience; their vulnerability; and, their 
accomplishments (Bandura, 1997).  As such, increasing efficacy can be seen to be 
at the core of increasing agency.   
The aim of this research is to gain further insight into the roles of political 
efficacy and belief in public efficacy as predictors of people‟s approval of future 
genetic science applications and attitudes to science governance.  The review of 
literature and current understanding leads to the following hypotheses: 
1. Greater belief in public efficacy is associated with less approving attitudes 
to genetic science. 
2. Higher political efficacy is associated with attitudes which prefer experts 
to make decisions about science governance. 
This research will also investigate how belief in public efficacy influences 
people‟s attitudes to science governance and how political efficacy influences 
people‟s approval of genetic science.  Current literature does not highlight any 
information on these relationships so this part of the work is exploratory.   
 2. Method 
Survey and respondents 
This study‟s research questions were addressed by secondary analysis of 
Eurobarometer survey data.  The data are from the Eurobarometers: „Europeans, 
Science and Technology‟ (63.1: number 224) and „Social Values, Science and 
Technology‟ (63.1: number 225) which were conducted together during 
November 2004.  The surveys were conducted in all European Union countries 
and used a multi-stage random sampling procedure to provide statistically 
representative samples of national residents aged 15 and over.  Though the content 
of the surveys was unique, these surveys were part of a range of standard and 
specific Eurobarometer surveys conducted since 1973.  These surveys have widely 
been used by European Governments and academics for research in this time.  The 
analyses in this study only use data obtained in the UK and Northern Ireland.  The 
total samples for the UK and Northern Ireland were 1002 and 305 respectively.  In 
this paper all inferential statistics are unweighted, while univariate descriptive 
statistics are weighted by the population sizes of the UK and Northern Ireland.   
 
Analyses 
The theoretical aims of this study are specifically addressed by two regression 
analyses.  These statistical models test the hypotheses by providing information on 
the direction and magnitude of the effects of efficacy on attitudes towards genetic 
science and science governance.  The first analysis uses linear regression to assess 
the role of two types of efficacy in predicting attitudes to genetic science.  The 
second analysis uses multinomial logistic regression to explore the role of two 




A number of the key variables used in these analyses were presented to only half 
of the survey respondents as part of the Eurobarometer survey‟s split ballot 
method.  As some of these variables are included in the final regression analyses, 
these analyses include less than half (once missing values are accounted for) of the 
original sample.  To increase the sample size for these analyses data from the UK 
and Northern Ireland are combined for analyses.  This is less than ideal, but 
previous research has identified similar attitudes among the Northern Irish and UK 
publics (Springer et al., 2002) and this approach is in line with many of the 
analyses which explore attitudes to science at the EU level (e.g. Gaskell et al., 
2005; Gaskell et al., 2004).  To assess the effect of this amalgamation, a dummy 
variable measuring the effect of Nation was included in all multivariate analyses. 
Ten questionnaire items in the survey dataset were identified as potential 
measures of efficacy.  The domain specific nature of efficacy means that two of 
these items that appeared to be assessing a generic personal efficacy were not 
retained for further analyses (Bandura, 1997).  The remaining eight items were 
believed to be related to the domain of science, technology and/or public 
involvement in decision making processes.  Where appropriate, response items 
were recoded so that high scores indicate more efficacious beliefs.  All 
respondents were asked to respond in (dis)agreement to six propositions: ‘I am 
interested in what is going on in politics and current affairs’ (political interest); ‘I 
feel well informed about what is going on in politics and current affairs’ 
 (politically informed); ‘People like me have too little influence in what the 
Government does’ (influence on Government); ‘People should involve themselves 
more in politics and current affairs’ (attitude to political involvement); ‘I think I 
have something to offer in decisions about politics and current affairs’ 
(contributing to political decision making); ‘I know how to get my voice heard 
when it comes to politics and public affairs issues’ (getting heard in politics).  For 
these analyses, responses to these items were coded as: 1= ‘strongly disagree’; 2= 
‘tend to disagree’; 3= ‘tend to agree’; 4= ‘strongly agree’; ‘don’t know’ responses 
were coded as missing.  Two efficacy items were presented to only half of all 
respondents (as part of the split ballot); they were asked to respond in 
(dis)agreement to two propositions: ‘For people like me it is not important to be 
involved in decisions about science and technology’ (Importance of public 
involvement (S&T)) and ‘The public is sufficiently involved in decisions about 
science and technology’ (Satisfaction with public involvement (S&T)).  For these 
analyses, responses to these items were coded as: 1= ‘strongly agree’; 2= ‘tend to 
agree’; 3= ‘neither agree nor disagree’; 4= ‘tend to disagree’; 5= ‘strongly 
disagree’; ‘don’t know’ responses were coded as missing.  The first analysis 
section below further reviews the operationalization of these efficacy variables 
and also the operationalization of other relevant independent and dependent 
variables used in the analyses. 
 3. Analysis I - operationalization of measures 
Efficacy 
A correlation matrix was produced to find out whether responses to the eight 
efficacy variables co-relate (N = 512).  Five items, political interest, politically 
informed, attitude to political involvement, contributing to political decision 
making and getting heard in politics show highly correlated (p < .001) responses 
and together appear suggestive of a potential latent factor measuring political 
efficacy.   
The two items assessing public involvement in decisions about science and 
technology (S&T) are highly correlated (r = .39; p < .001).  The item labelled 
importance of public involvement (S&T) tests agreement with the proposition „For 
people like me it is not important to be involved in decisions about science and 
technology‟ (emphasis added), and it is perhaps unsurprising that responses to this 
item also correlate most significantly with the two items which most precisely ask 
for respondents views on involvement in political processes - attitude to political 
involvement and contributing to political decision making.  There are also 
significant (p < .001), though weaker (r = .14 and r = .15, respectively), 
correlations between these items and respondent‟s satisfaction with the level of 
public involvement in science and technology (satisfaction with public 
involvement (S&T)).   
Responses to the influence on Government item do not correlate with the 
other items identified as measuring political efficacy and as such this survey 
measure was not a candidate for further analysis.  This lack of correlation may be 
due to question wording and specificity.  The item specifically refers to 
government decisions, while other questions ask about “politics and public 
 affairs” so incorporate a wider range of opportunities for people to consider their 
own efficaciousness when responding to such items. 
Exploratory Factor Analysis (Maximum Likelihood extraction; 
eigenvalues > 1), with oblimin rotation, was conducted to explore the underlying 
structure of the remaining seven items (Table 1).  As expected from the 
correlation matrix discussed above, the factor loadings show two correlated, yet 
distinct factors.  The second factor, which includes the two items relating to public 
involvement in decisions about science and technology, contains only two items
1
 
and therefore individual-level composite scores were computed based on the mean 
values for these two items.  These items formed the basis of a tentative latent 
factor measuring Belief in Public Efficacy (BPE) in decisions about science and 
technology.  This two-item measure is not ideal, neither is it as robust a measure 
as one with a greater number of indicator variables; however, this cannot be 
avoided as the Eurobarometer survey from which this data has come from was not 
designed specifically to measure public efficacy.   
 
--- Table 1 about here ----- 
 
The Factor Analysis (Maximum Likelihood extraction; eigenvalues > 1; N 
= 1135) was rerun with only the variables that were believed to represent political 
efficacy.  The results indicated a one-factor solution fits well (  (5) = 115.556, p 
< .001), all factor loadings were sufficient (> .5) and the factor accounts for 42% 
of the shared variance in these five items (extracted eigenvalue = 2.111).  These 
five items form a reliable scale measure (Cronbach‟s  = 0.78).  Individual level 
factor scores were computed to act as measures of PE in regression analyses. 
  
Other Independent Variables for Analysis 
Other items included in the Eurobarometer dataset were operationalized to provide 
measurements of key constructs widely used as predictors of attitudes to science 
and technology in the research literature.  Of these, some of the most prevalent 
and widely discussed are attentiveness to science, trust in agents involved in 
science and technology and scientific knowledge.  Analyses also include items 
measuring three demographic variables often included in such analyses: age, 
gender and education. 
Attentiveness to science was based on responses to five items selected 
from the survey.  Three of these items asked how interested respondents were in 
„new medical discoveries‟, „new inventions and technologies‟ and „new scientific 
discoveries‟.  Relevant responses to these items were on a three-point scale and 
were reverse coded from the original data to aid interpretation in later analyses, 
where: 1 = ‘not at all interested’; 2 = ‘moderately interested’; 3 = ‘very 
interested’.  The additional two items asked respondents how often they read 
about science and spoke to their friends about science and technology.  Relevant 
responses were recoded to indicate more frequent behaviours with higher values 
where: 1 = ‘never’; 2 = ‘hardly ever’; 3 = ‘occasionally’; 4 = ‘regularly’.  For all 
five items ‘don’t know’ responses were excluded from analyses.  These five items 
were strongly correlated (p < .001) and found to form a reliable scale 
(Cronbach‟s  = 0.81).   Factor Analysis (Maximum Likelihood extraction; 
eigenvalues > 1; N = 1292) indicated a one-factor solution fits well (  (5) = 
345.354, p < .001), all factor loadings were sufficient (> .5) and the factor 
accounts for 48% of the shared variance in these five items (extracted eigenvalue 
 = 2.422).  Individual level factor scores were computed to act as measures of 
attentiveness in later regression analyses. 
As a measure of scientific knowledge a seventeen–point scale (Cronbach‟s 
 = 0.67) was constructed from responses to one item querying respondent‟s 
understanding of what it means to study something scientifically (one point was 
added for each of four responses taken to be accurate descriptions of scientific 
study) and one point was allocated for each of 13 correctly answered textbook-
style science questions with true or false response options (e.g. „The Sun goes 
around the Earth‟ and „It is the mother‟s genes that decide whether the baby is a 
boy or a girl‟).  This type of scale has been widely used to measure scientific 
knowledge in survey data analysis (Gaskell et al, 2004; Sturgis & Allum, 2004; 
Durrant, Evans & Thomas, 1989). 
Trust has received a large amount of attention from researchers and 
although it is not a key variable of substantive importance in the work here, its 
relationship to PE and BPE in the context of attitudes to science and technology 
and to the governance of science and technology is of interest.  Unfortunately, no 
items in the Eurobarometer dataset directly queried respondents‟ perceptions of 
trust in agents involved in science and technology; however, items asking for 
respondents‟ beliefs about the effects (whether they are positive or negative) of 
many stakeholders and groups involved in science and technology were included 
in the survey.  For this study‟s purposes these work as suitable proxies for trust.  
Past research identifies trust in public authorities, scientists and industry as 
particularly relevant to attitudes towards science and technology (Gaskell et al., 
2004) and the domain specificity of these agents is immediately apparent.  Again, 
the Eurobarometer dataset is not ideal in this regard.  Its split ballot method means 
 that the trust-proxy items were split and between the two halves of the sample.  As 
the BPE measure is also limited by the split ballot design, analyses were already 
limited to the trust items in split „A‟ of the survey.  This is unfortunate as the three 
items testing trust in public authorities all lie in split „B‟.  On face validity, the 
most relevant item within split „A‟ measuring trust in science and technology 
governance asks what effect “industry developing new products” has on society.  
This item was operationalized as a trust in industry measure for further analyses 
and was recoded so that high value responses indicate higher trust where: 1 = 
‘very negative effect’; 2 = ‘fairly negative effect’; 3 = ‘fairly positive effect’; 4 = 
‘very positive effect’.  This single measure is not an ideal method of modelling the 
effects of trust in agents involved in science and technology but acts as a 




For the regression analyses, age is measured in whole years.  Dummy 
variables were created to measure gender, with females acting as the reference 
category in all analyses.  In PUS research based on survey data, education is often 
measured as those with degree level or science qualifications compared to those 
without.  The Eurobarometer dataset records the age at which people finished their 
education, this variable acts as an interval variable to indicate education.  A 
dummy variable was created to measure nation, with the UK acting as the 
reference category in all analyses.   
 
Dependent variables 
A measure of attitudes to genetic science was constructed from responses to six 
items measuring the approval of six possible future applications of genetic 
 science.  Respondent‟s were asked under what circumstances they would approve: 
„Cloning animals such as monkeys or pigs for research into human diseases’; 
‘Cloning human beings so that couples can have a baby even when one partner 
has a genetic disease’; ‘Developing for children a genetic test that would identify 
their talents and weaknesses’; ‘Developing genetic treatments to get rid of 
people’s bad habits like smoking or alcoholism’; ‘Developing genetically modified 
bacteria that could clean up the environment after environmental catastrophes’; 
and ‘Storing everyone’s genetic data so that criminals can be caught easily’3.  The 
four-point response scales were reverse coded so that high values are indicative of 
more approving attitudes to genetic science applications, where valid responses 
were: 1 = ‘never’; 2 = ‘only in exceptional circumstances’; 3 = ‘only if it is highly 
regulated and controlled’; 4 = ‘in all circumstances’.  Factor scores were 
computed on the basis of a single factor solution to Factor Analysis (which was 
chosen as the simplest structure).  All variables showed statistically significant 
correlations with each other (p < .01), scale reliability was adequate for 
exploratory work of this nature (Cronbach‟s  = 0.68), factor loadings were 
sufficient (> .4) and the chi-square statistic indicated good fit (  (9) = 44.355, p < 
.001; N = 556).  The factor explains 27% of the shared variance in the items 
(extracted eigenvalue = 1.604). 
To investigate the effect of efficacy on attitudes towards science 
governance, this study replicates a measure used by Gaskell et al. (2005) to 
classify public attitudes of how, and by who, decisions about science and 
technology should be made.  Respondents were asked which of two views were 
closest to their own in two forced-choice items.  First, should decisions about 
science and technology be based primarily on an analysis of the „risks and 
 benefits‟ or the „moral and ethical issues‟ involved?  Second, should these 
decisions be based primarily on the risks and benefits „as advised by experts‟ or 
‘as viewed by the general public‟?  Four groups each representing a distinct 
preference to science governance can be created based on the responses to these 
two items: scientific elitists opted for decisions based on expert advice and 
scientific evidence (i.e. risk-benefit analyses); moral elitists opted for decisions 
based on expert advice on moral and ethical criteria; scientific democrats opted for 
decisions based on the public‟s views of the scientific evidence; moral democrats 
opted for decisions based on the public‟s views of the moral and ethical issues.  In 
the Eurobarometer sample (N = 1148) these views were distributed as 54%, 22%, 
11% and 13% of the sample, respectively. 
 
4. Analysis II - modelling the effects of efficacy 
Modelling the effect of efficacy on attitudes towards genetic science 
A hierarchical linear regression analysis was performed with attitude to genetic 
science as the outcome measure.  Of the split sample of 640 respondents, 442 
valid cases were entered into the models.   
Predictor variables were entered into the model in a controlled order that 
was based on their theoretical relevance; control variables were entered earlier and 
those of more substantive interest to the current study were added later.  Predictor 
variables were selected by their importance as based on previous literature and 
research. 
Four demographic variables, age, gender, education, and nation were 
entered first as they are causally prior to any other predictors.  The next three 
variables were entered separately: first, attentiveness to science; second, scientific 
 knowledge; and, third, trust in industry.  Finally, the two efficacy variables were 
entered one after the other: first, political efficacy (PE); second, belief in public 
efficacy (BPE). 
This hierarchical regression method calculates the variance attributable to 
the four demographic variables together, then of each of the additional variables 
separately.  Therefore, if BPE accounts for any significant percentage of variance 
in attitudes to genetic science, it is after all other variables have been introduced.  
The same applies for PE, but minus BPE. 
Table 2 shows the results of all six regression models predicting attitudes 
towards genetic science.  Model diagnostics showed no indications of 
multicollinearity (Mean VIF = 1.21; lowest tolerance value of .78 for BPE). 
 
--- Table 2 about here --- 
 
The model shows that the measure of PE does not account for a significant 
amount of variance in attitudes to genetic science over trust in industry, scientific 
knowledge, attentiveness, education, gender, age and nation (R change = .003, 
F(8, 433) = 1.487, p = .223).  The BPE measure does, however, account for a 
small but significant amount of variance over and above that explained by all 
other variables in the model (R change = .010, F(9, 432) = 5.158, p = .024). 
As expected, the four demographic variables account for a reasonable and 
significant amount of variance (R change = .071, F(4, 437) = 8.358, p < .001); as 
does scientific knowledge (R change = .016, F(6, 435) = 7.537, p = .006) and trust 
in industry (R change = .041, F(7, 438) = 34.318, p < .001).  By comparing 
R values it is possible to see that BPE (1%) uniquely accounts for about two thirds 
 of the proportion of unique variance accounted for by scientific knowledge (1.6%) 
and about a quarter of the unique variance accounted for by trust in industry 
(4.1%).   
The parameters of the final model in the hierarchical regression (Table 3) 
show that PE is not a significant predictor of approval of genetic science (p = 
.361).  Greater belief in public efficacy is associated with less approval of genetic 
science (p = .024).  Higher BPE has a negative effect on approval of genetic 
science (Beta = -.11) that is of similar magnitude to the positive effect of higher 
attentiveness (Beta = .13)
4
.  Scientific knowledge is often argued to have a low, 
but positive, correlation (Gaskell et al., 2004) with attitudes to science so it is 
interesting to note that in this model higher levels of scientific knowledge have a 
negative effect on genetic science approval.  It is less surprising to see that greater 
BPE has the opposite effect on approval as that of greater trust in industry (Beta = 
.20).  It is also possible to see that the magnitude of effect BPE has on approval is 
just over half that of trust in industry, gender (Beta = .20) and age (Beta = -.19). 
 
--- Table 3 about here --- 
 
Modelling the effect of efficacy on attitudes towards science governance 
A multinomial logistic regression model was fitted to assess what 
influence PE and BPE have on people‟s preferred principles of science 
governance (how, and by who, decisions about science and technology should be 
made).  Of the split sample of 640 respondents, 438 valid cases were entered into 
the model.  Of these there were 213 scientific elitists, 45 scientific democrats, 107 
moral elitists, and 73 moral democrats.  Two models were fitted.  The first 
 replicated the variables used by Gaskell et al. (2005)
5
 along with the nation, 
attentiveness and scientific knowledge variables.  In the second model the 
measures of PE and BPE were added.  This „nested‟ approach allows assessment 
of the unique variance associated with the addition of the two new variables, PE 
and BPE.  For both models, the majority group (those opting for scientific elitism) 
were entered as the reference category. 
Comparing the -2 log likelihood test statistics from the models with and 
without the two efficacy variables shows that their inclusion in the model as 
predictors of science governance trends towards significance, but over the whole 
model they do not seem to increase explanatory power compared to the first model 
without them (  (6) = 11.113, p < .080).  Pseudo R
2 
measures indicate that 
approximately 2 percent of the variation in governance can be explained by the 
addition of PE and BPE to the model. 
The likelihood ratio tests for the independent variables show that neither 
PE (  (3) = 5.77, p = .123) nor BPE (  (3) = 3.38, p = .095) offers significant 
improvements to, and over, the entire model when considering all other associated 
parameters simultaneously.  However, a comparison of chi-square statistics 





magnitude of effect in the final model of ten variables so may be candidates for 
inclusion if this research were searching for the simplest and most parsimonious 
model.  However, as the current aim is to investigate the relevance of efficacy in 
relation to other more established variables this approach was not taken. 
 
--- Table 4 about here --- 
 
 Turning to the role of the independent variables in the final model
6
 (see 
Table 4) shows that a single standard deviation (s = 1.02) increase in BPE results 
in a 60% increase in the proportional odds of opting for scientific democracy 
rather than scientific elitism, all else held equal
7
.  The coefficients also show that 
for one standard deviation (s = 0.86) increase in PE the proportional odds of 
opting for scientific democracy decrease by 39%, all else held equal.  In other 
words people in the scientific democrat group are more likely to have a strong 
belief in public efficacy and feel less politically efficacious, as well as being less 
attentive to science and have less scientific knowledge.  And accordingly, the 
majority of people, i.e. the scientific elitists, are more likely to believe less in 
public efficacy while feeling more politically efficacious in themselves, as well as 
being more knowledgeable and be more attentive to science and technology. 
Odds ratio plots (Figure 1) show that lower PE is associated with scientific 
democrats to a greater degree than any other group.  This means that those people 
who feel they are more politically efficacious are more likely to be moral elitists, 
scientific elitists or moral democrats than scientific democrats.  However, higher 
PE does not significantly distinguish between these three groups.  Although in 
terms of statistical significance, BPE only predicts the difference between 
scientific elitists and democrats discussed above; it also shows a trend where 
increased BPE is again most characteristic of the difference between scientific 
democrats and all other groups. 
 
--- Figure 1 about here --- 
 
5. Discussion 
 One of the aims of this study was to provide insight into the influence of 
political efficacy and belief in public efficacy on people‟s approval of future 
genetic science applications.  Controlling for a range of socio-demographic 
characteristics and other well known influences on scientific attitudes, the findings 
outlined above show that those who believe in a more involved public are less 
approving of genetic science, confirming the study‟s first hypothesis.  Exploratory 
analyses found that variation in political efficacy does not significantly influence 
people‟s approval of genetic science.  As discussed in the introduction to this 
research, much of the impetus for public involvement in science comes from the 
„selling science‟ agenda (Sturgis & Allum, 2004; OST & Wellcome Trust, 2001; 
Nelkin & Lindee, 1995).  For anyone subscribing to an agenda that only wishes to 
advance the interests of science the results presented here may suggest public 
agency should not be developed, in particular, those results that suggest increasing 
agency will reduce approval of risky science applications.  While those with an 
interest in making science more democratic may need to accept that with 
increased agency may come increased critique.  This effect may be comparable to 
that of “critical trust”, which has shown that it is possible to be critical of an 
application without rejecting it (Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003; Walls et al., 2004).  It 
has been argued elsewhere that this democratisation of science is not only in the 
best interests of social justice but also science itself (Allen & Bassett, 2004).   
The above findings support previous research and further suggest the value 
of a measure of belief in public efficacy (Barnett, Cooper and Senior, 2007).  
However, the reliance on only two-items limits the measures face validity.  For 
example, it could be argued that it would still be possible to agree that „it is not 
important for the public to be involved in science and technology‟ and also agree 
 that „the public is sufficiently involved in science and technology‟ without lacking 
a belief in public efficacy.  However, the combination of these measures offers a 
vast improvement over using only one measure, as has been done in previous 
research (ibid.).  Still, there may be some apprehension about the measures of 
efficacy used in this study.  Although informed by previous research (ibid.), the 
argument for two distinct forms of efficacy was primarily based on results from a 
factor analysis.  However, the findings from this study now provide further 
substantial support for an assertion of two forms of efficacy and for two reasons.  
First, the addition of a measure of belief in public efficacy to the model predicting 
approval of genetic science added unique and significant variance over and above 
a model that was already controlling for political efficacy.  Second, the two forms 
of efficacy were seen to have opposing effects in the model predicting people‟s 
favoured principles of science governance.  These findings highlight not only 
statistical but substantive differences between the influences of these two forms of 
perceived efficacy.  The first of these differences is: an increase in belief in public 
efficacy has a negative influence on attitudes to genetic science, while political 
efficacy has no significant influence.  The second difference is: higher belief in 
public efficacy is associated with preference for principles of governance based on 
the public’s understanding of scientific evidence, while higher political efficacy is 
associated with preference for principles of governance based on expert’s 
understanding of scientific evidence.  This provides some support for the study‟s 
second hypothesis that higher political efficacy is associated with attitudes which 
prefer experts to make decisions about science governance.  However, the null 
hypothesis is not rejected because political efficacy had no effect in distinguishing 
between those opting for principles of moral democracy and either of the two 
 options preferring experts to make decisions.  It is also interesting to note that the 
Northern Irish public are more likely to opt for scientific democracy over 
scientific elitism.  This may be unsurprising considering the long-term tensions 
between the public and the state in Northern Ireland.  After centuries of UK rule in 
Ireland, Northern Ireland remained under the rule of the United Kingdom when 
the rest of Ireland gained independence in the 1920‟s.  Northern Ireland‟s 
affiliation with the UK, self-rule and its relationship to the independent state of 
Ireland has been a divisive and violent topic for most of the last century.  Conflict 
has only shown signs of abating in recent years alongside the establishment of a 
devolved power-sharing government made up of both unionist (UK facing) and 
nationalist (Ireland facing) political parties.  A speculative explanation would be 
that this struggle has led the Northern Irish public to value democratic decision 
making to a stronger degree than the UK public.  Most importantly, this finding 
suggests it would be prudent to look at the relationship between efficacy, public 
involvement and nation in future research. 
The findings presented here reiterate the well established opinion that with 
higher trust come more positive attitudes.  However, they also find that increased 
scientific knowledge has a negative influence on approval.  This negative 
association is counter to prevailing understanding that suggests more knowledge 
results in more favourable attitudes.  However, it is not the first instance in which 
a negative influence has been found (e.g. Sturgis, Cooper and Fife-Schaw 2005).  
Without wanting to place too much emphasis on this peripheral finding, it does 
nevertheless undermine the view: „to know science is to love it‟.  For the current 
case of future genetic science applications, it may be that more knowledgeable 
 persons are sceptical because they also know of the limitations of current 
scientific understanding regarding genomics.   
This study also aimed to understand how political efficacy and belief in 
public efficacy influence people‟s attitudes to science governance.  Beyond the 
earlier discussion of this study‟s hypotheses, the type of science governance 
people opt for was found to be influenced by efficacy in a simple but interesting 
way.  That is, it is simple at a statistical level but the practical implications may be 
more complicated.  This study has found that the effect of raising efficacy is 
determined by the governance principles people begin with.  Raising political 
efficacy is only likely to have an effect on people‟s choice of governing principles 
for those who start with a preference for a scientific democratic system of 
governance.  This means, raising political efficacy may result in someone moving 
from scientific democratic principles to any of the other type of principles (though 
most likely a variant of elitism) but this will not have any effect on those 
originally opting for any other type of principles.  Whereas any successful 
attempts to raise belief in public efficacy will only invoke a shift in principles for 
scientific elitists.  This presents a situation where increasing agency has very 
specific effects depending on whose agency is being raised and also what type of 
agency is being raised.  In its broadest terms, the implications for policy and 
practice are thus:  raise political efficacy if you want science to continue to be 
governed by experts; raise belief in public efficacy if you want to increase public 
involvement in decision making and/or want less permissive attitudes.  This is 
where the practical complications mentioned above become apparent.  Firstly, 
how can efficacy be raised?  Secondly and even more problematical, how can one 
type of efficacy be raised without the other?  These are questions for both practice 
 and research.  Evaluation of public involvement initiatives is still sparse and 
embryonic (for some examples and discussion see: Rowe et al., 2005; Einsiedel, 
2002) but the findings presented here support the inclusion of the measurement of 
participant‟s efficacy in such evaluations.  This may then allow the mechanisms 
underlying attitudinal change to be better understood.  The measures of efficacy 
used here do appear to be relevant to the study of attitudes towards genetic science 
and science governance.  However, there is a need to develop valid, reliable and 
more comprehensive measures of efficacy, of which examples are available in 
other research areas (e.g. Bandura, 1997, 2000, Fernandez-Ballesteros et al., 
2002), and to incorporate these into future research, monitoring and evaluation. 
This study has built on previous exploratory work to show that it is 
important to consider perceived efficacy in its different forms as these are likely to 
relate to attitudes towards science in unique ways.  Also, findings indicate the 
effects of increasing efficacy may result in a whole array of outcomes depending 
on whose and what type of efficacy is being increased.  Overall, the findings here 
provide further support for suggestions that it is simplistic to consider increasing 
public involvement as a way of increasing the approval of risky new technologies 
(Barnett, Cooper & Senior, 2007).  The findings also show that more needs to be 
understood about the nature of the effects associated with public participation, 
perhaps by evaluating public involvement activity at the psycho-social level to 
uncover what change underlies any attitudinal shift.  As discussed in the analysis 
sections, the measure of trust used in this study is partial and there is scope to 
further investigate the relationships discussed here with a more comprehensive 
measurement of this important variable.  Additionally, the role of efficacy should 
be considered for other technological and scientific applications.  Though belief in 
 public efficacy plays a greater role than political efficacy in predicting this study‟s 
quite general measure of attitudes to genetic science, it is uncertain whether this 
would be true for all types of genetic science application.  Datasets containing 
more robust measures of attitudes to specific applications and also more robust 
efficacy measures would allow greater analytical scrutiny.  Finally, further 
understanding of the role of efficacy could be obtained through research which 
identifies the structural pathways and, if possible, causal pathways linking 
efficacy and the publics formation of attitudes towards science and technology.   
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 According to G. David Garson (n.d.) and Andy Field (2005) current opinion 
suggests at least three variables be used to compute factor scores. 
2
 Data obtained from our trust in industry item correlate well with other data 
collected from respondents‟ perceptions on the effects of: newspapers & 
magazines reporting on S&T (r = .364, p < 0.001); TV & radio reporting on S&T 
(r = .385, p < 0.001); scientists in universities (r = .390, p < 0.001); consumer 
organisations testing new products (r = .297, p < 0.001).  A composite of these 
four items with our trust in industry item would provide a reliable scale 
(Cronbach‟s  = 0.75) but the substantive value of combining perceptions about 
 such disparate groups was felt inappropriate for this study‟s aims.  It was therefore 
concluded to progress with a single item measure of trust in pursuit of greater face 
validity. 
3
 In light of the earlier discussion regarding the face validity of combining 
dissimilar trust measures it is appropriate to consider the selection of variables 
chosen here.  The ensuing analysis and discussion will make reference to findings 
in terms of attitudes towards and/or approval of genetic science and it is important 
to remember that in reality attitudes and/or approval may vary considerably 
between applications.  However, in this exploratory work with a dataset of limited 
options this combination of applications is felt reasonable as even though the 
applications differ in applied terms they can all clearly be seen to be grounded in 
genetic science.   
4
 These comparisons of Beta (or Standardised B) values indicate the number of 
standard deviation changes in the „attitudes to genetic science‟ variable that result 
from a single standard deviation increase in the relevant predictor variable.  It is 
important to note that this is only true when all other variables in the model are 
held constant. 
5
 Minus income as it was not available in the dataset. 
6
 Please contact the authors for more details of both nested models. 
7
 This interpretation can be made for any of the odds ratios shown in Table 4.  An 
interesting and simplified example to draw attention to is: the odds of being a 
scientific democrat for people in Northern Ireland are 2.8 times the odds of being 
a scientific elitist. 
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Political interest 0.72 0.03 
Politically informed 0.68 -0.10 
Attitude to political involvement 0.51 0.22 
Contributing to political decision making 0.68 0.17 
Getting heard in politics 0.63 -0.13 
Importance of public involvement (S&T) 0.15 0.64 
Satisfaction with public involvement (S&T) -0.09 0.62 
Notes: N = 512; Factor loadings higher than 0.40 are in bold; 
2
 (8) = 63.356, p < .001;  
factors are correlated: r = 0.22; factor interpretations: 1 = PE; 2 = BPE. 






Table 2. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Models Predicting Attitudes Toward Genetic Science 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Constant 0.510 * 0.550 ** 0.914 *** -0.132  -0.194  0.087  
 (.204)  (.204)  (.243)  (.331)  (.334)  (.355)  
Age (years) -0.007 *** -0.007 *** -0.008 *** -0.008 *** -0.008 *** -0.008 *** 
 (.002)  (.002)  (.002)  (.002)  (.002)  (.002)  
Gender: male 0.347 *** 0.322 *** 0.360 *** 0.347 *** 0.344 *** 0.328 *** 
 (.077)  (.078)  (.079)  (.077)  (.077)  (.077)  
Education (by age) -0.017 † -0.019 * -0.015 † -0.011  -0.009  -0.008  
 (.009)  (.009)  (.009)  (.009)  (.009)  (.009)  
Nation: Northern Ireland 0.044  0.048  0.042  0.037  0.041  0.033  
 (.090)  (.090)  (.090)  (.090)  (.090)  (.090)  
Attentiveness   0.074 † 0.105 * 0.074 † 0.093 * 0.118 * 
   (.043)  (.044)  (.044)  (.046)  (.047)  
Scientific Knowledge     -0.045 ** -0.040 * -0.037 * -0.030 † 
     (.016)  (.016)  (.016)  (.016)  
Trust in industry       0.289 *** 0.284 *** 0.283 *** 
       (.064)  (.064)  (.064)  
PE         -0.058  -0.044  
         (.048)  (.048)  
BPE           -0.094 * 
           (.041)  
R  .071  .077  .093  .134  .137  .147  
Adjusted R  .063  .067  .081  .120  .121  .130  
Standard error of the 
regression .803  .801  .795  .778  .778  .774  
Statistical significance of 
change in R  ---   .085   .006   .000   .223   .024   
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01.; *** p < .001          
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  N = 442          






Table 3. Regression of Age, Gender, Education, Nation, Attentiveness, Scientific Knowledge, 
Trust in Industry, PE and BPE on Attitude to Genetic Science 
Variables   B SE   Beta   T   Sig T 
          
Age (years) - 0.01 0.002 - .19 - 3.96  .000 
Gender: male  0.33 0.077  .20  4.24  .000 
Education (by age) - 0.01 0.009 - .04 - 0.90  .366 
Nation: Northern Ireland  0.03 0.087  .02  0.38  .707 
Attentiveness  0.12 0.047  .13  2.50  .013 
Scientific Knowledge - 0.03 0.016 - .09 - 1.86  .064 
Trust in industry  0.28 0.063  .20  4.46  .000 
PE - 0.04 0.048 - .05 - 0.91  .361 
BPE - 0.09 0.041 - .11 - 2.27  .024 
Constant   0.09 0.355       0.24   .807 
Notes: Adj r  =0.13, F(9, 432) = 44.691, Sig. F = 0.000. 




Table 4. Multinomial Logistic Regression Predicting Governance Choice with 
Scientific Elitists as Reference Category (Odds Ratios) 
 
scientific 
democrats  moral elitists moral democrats 
Age (years)  1.00 (ns)  1.01 (ns)  1.00 (ns) 
Education (in years)  0.98 (ns)  1.05†  0.99 (ns) 
Religiosity  1.02 (ns)  1.14*  1.11† 
Trust in industry  0.73 (ns)  0.66*  0.75 (ns) 
Attentiveness  0.50**  0.77 (ns)  0.74† 
Scientific Knowledge  0.81**  0.89*  0.85** 
PE  0.61*  1.07 (ns)  1.00 (ns) 
BPE  1.60*  1.17 (ns)  1.19 (ns) 
Gender: Male  1.84†  1.57†  1.37 (ns) 
Nation: Northern Ireland  2.81*  1.30 (ns)  1.71 (ns) 
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01. 
Notes: N = 438; Cox and Snell = .161; Nagelkerke = .176. 







Figure 1. Odds Ratio Plots for Predicting Science Governance Choice (with Scientific Elitists 
as the Reference Category) 
 
Full line p > .10; dotted line p < .10; no line p < .05. 
Notes: SE: scientific elitists; SD: scientific democrats; ME: moral elitists; MD: moral 
democrats. 
The plots show the change in the proportional odds of opting for SD, MD or ME rather than 
scientific elitism for a single standard deviation increase in PE or BPE, when all else is held 
equal.  The lines or absence of lines in the plots also show the significance of PE and BPE as 
predictors of all other comparisons of science governance categories. 
Source: Eurobarometer 63.1, 2005. UK & Northern Ireland. 
 
 
